Despite the downfall of both Suharto and Marcos, no real democratic reform has occurred in Indonesia or the Philippines. The succeeding leaders have proved reluctant to upset the status quo, and the consolidation of democracy appears to have stalled in both countries.
Vincent Boudreau’s article “critically examines the concept that democracy is spread from country to country via the diffusion of democratic ideas” (Boudreau, 1999: 3). Boudreau compares the Philippine movement against Marcos in 1986 and the Indonesian movement against Suharto in 1998. He argues that structural and historical differences, particularly in relations between the state and the populace, produced different transitions from authoritarian rule in both countries. According to Boudreau the creation of parallels between the two cases is misleading because of their different structural and historical backgrounds. This essay examines the argument that democratic practices are initiated by a regime. I argue that elite-initiated liberalising gestures, which are rarely (if ever) genuinely democratic, occur in response to anti-regime pressures. But first, I will highlight some concerns regarding the content of Boudreau’s article.
Several discrepancies emerge throughout this article. Although a convincing argument is ultimately presented, it is evident that Boudreau utilises information in a markedly biased and frequently incorrect manner. He presents a strong argument, however it is flawed and somewhat discredited due to data inaccuracies and omissions. I mention this because it is important to seek to identify and distinguish fact from fiction in order to analyse information effectively and formulate rational conclusions. In short, the Philippine case is favoured over the Indonesian case, with the democracy movement in the Philippines portrayed as a success, while that in Indonesia is largely portrayed as a failure. A major problem emerges regarding Boudreau’s description of the use of power by Marcos and Suharto throughout the article. Boudreau states that Marcos held periodic elections and allowed brief periods of liberalisation. Suharto is portrayed as feeling compelled to do neither. In actual fact, both leaders relaxed restrictions on the press and dressed up their administrations in democratic garb. From the late 1980s to the mid-1990s, Indonesia experienced the longest period of ‘openness’, tolerance, and political debate during Suharto’s reign, albeit within the confines of New Order orthodoxy (Elson, 2001). I will now explore further the rationale behind the decision of a regime to allow periods of ‘openness’.
Some scholars state that mass political culture has certain influences over the political process, but maintain that democratic culture is not a prerequisite for democracy. They argue that democratic political culture emerges at the elite level. It is also argued that elites select democracy because they believe the costs outweigh the benefits in trying to suppress political opposition. However, application of such arguments can prove problematic. In Indonesia and the Philippines, neither of which are genuine democracies, rulers maintain and legitimate authoritarian rule under the guise of democratic practices. Thus, prospects for genuine and meaningful elite-instigated democratisation are slim. Openings for democracy come from above, although genuine democratic reform is not necessarily intended by these hollow gestures, in response to pressure from below. This is evident in Indonesia and the Philippines.
In Indonesia, Suharto only allowed a more open political atmosphere after many years of repressing and depoliticising society. By the end of the 1980s, Suharto ruled a rapidly changing society due to social and economic changes. A nascent civil society was emerging which clamoured for more direct and transparent political participation. Thus, Indonesia’s increased prosperity created a more sophisticated society increasingly difficult to repress (Elson, 2001).
In the Philippines, Marcos’ “short-term strategy to derail an opposition alliance produced over time more movement vehicles against the state. Each election, plebiscite, or liberalising measure enticed new (as well as established) oppositionists to speak and act against the regime” (Boudreau, 1999: 5). Thus, “the anti-dictatorship movement accumulated increasingly broad and established movement institutions…this accumulation both forced Marcos’s periodic liberalising gestures and produced such protest during these open moments as to compel the regime to resort to violence and cheating that…further polarised society and hastened the regime’s demise” (Boudreau, 1999: 6).
In concluding this essay, I maintain that initial openings for democracy, whether genuine or not, may be initiated by a ruling elite in response to pressure from below. However, despite the downfall of both Suharto and Marcos, no real democratic reform has occurred in Indonesia or the Philippines. The succeeding leaders have proved reluctant to upset the status quo, and the consolidation of democracy appears to have stalled in both countries. Thus, theories espousing the importance of the initiation of democratic political culture at the elite level are convincing.
REFERENCES:
Boudreau, V. 1999. ‘Diffusing democracy? People power in Indonesia and the Philippines?’, Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, 31 (4): 3-18, Cedar, Michigan
Elson, R. E. 2001. Suharto – A Political Biography, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom
Shi, T. 2000. “Political culture: A prerequisite for democracy?”, American Asian Review, 18 (2): 53-83, Queens
