The question of what makes a democracy has come under the international spotlight since the US-led war on Iraq. Media articles regarding the rebuilding of post-war Iraq overwhelmingly tout democracy as the only so-called “game in the global village.” Democracy and its derivatives are combined with terms such as ‘impose,’ ‘force’ and ‘conquer,’ creating seemingly paradoxical statements, undermining the essence of democracy. Everyone, from politicians to political analysts and journalists, profess to know what the people of Iraq want and how best to achieve this. The apparent historical triumph of liberal democracy is heralded as indomitable, and taken to be a predetermined objective point upon which ‘everyone’ is agreed.
In questioning the highly problematic statist hegemonic discourse on democracy and democratisation promoted by the United States, various questions arise: Is there a future for liberal democracy as a universally applicable political model? To what extent can democracy vary with regard to form? If form differs (as it already does in many Western democracies), can democratic content, such as freedoms and respect for human rights, remain? Is it primarily elites who make, shape and consolidate democracy? Should Iraqi’s wait for democracy to be handed to them from ‘above’? In exploring these questions I believe it is necessary to make problematic what is taken for granted. For instance, a prevalence to view liberal democracy as the most desirable outcome with little reflection upon the difficulties involved in its implementation; uncritical acceptance of the word ‘democracy’ as a potentially universal “all-embracing phenomenon” (George 2003: 16); the right of the Iraqi people to self-determination. Although I remain critical of the statist hegemonic discourse on democracy and democratisation promoted by the United States, I do not believe it is possible to attempt to seek “the solution of a problem in the solution of another problem raised at another moment by other people” (Foucault 1983: 343 cited in Bernstein 1995: 226). At the same time, however, it is not my intention to claim that liberal democratic institutions have no value for non-Western societies. I do not purport to know what future constellation – social, economic, political – Iraqi’s desire to create; instead, I believe it is vital to question and critique the use of liberal democracy, both as an analytic tool and in practice. I believe that non-Western societies have to determine the value themselves in the light of their cultural resources, needs and circumstances, while remaining aware that these cannot be mechanically transplanted (Parekh 1993: 171-172). Surely, “[a]s long as the forms of government are acceptable to their people and meet the basic conditions of good government, …they must be at liberty to work out their political destiny themselves” (Parekh 1993: 170).
Reference
Baker, G. 2002. Civil Society and Democratic Theory: Alternative Voices, London: Routledge.
Bernstein, R. 1995. ‘Foucault: Critique as a Philosophic Ethos,’ in Michael Kelly (ed.), Critique and Power, Cambridge, Massachussetts and London: The MIT Press, pp. 211-242.
George, S. 2003. ‘Globalizing rights?,’ in Matthew J. Gibney (ed.), Globalizing Rights: The Oxford Amnesty Lectures 1999, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 15-33.
Parekh, B. 1993. ‘The cultural particularity of liberal democracy,’ in David Held (ed.), Prospects for Democracy: North, South, East, West, Cambridge: Polity Press, pp. 156-175.
Parenti, M. 1980. Democracy for the Few, New York: St Martin’s Press.
