A Price Too High: Nuclear Proliferation and the Islamic Republic of Iran

There are many crucial international issues in play today. Some like global border conflicts, issues of national sovereignty, or issues of presidential elections are important to regional disputes or balance of power issues and certainly play a role in how nations interact with each other. However, there are few problems as looming as the issues of nuclear proliferation and control. The clashes surrounding this issue, paramount to global security and peace, are a short step away from falling into chaos and throwing the world into deadly anarchy. This unusual circumstance can be best embodied by the international controversy about Iran. The Islamic Republic has played a bold game as of late. Testing the will of the international community, it has willfully flaunted its ability to enrich uranium and has spit in the face of economic sanctions in a time of increasing financial hardship. Taking little heed to the opinions and desires of the United Nations and the International Community, it has embarked on a national crusade, making nuclear power a symbol of national pride. However, the pomp and bluster aside, there are very important legal issues to debate here. Nuclear proliferation has been at the heart of international discussion for decades. Specifically, in regards to Iran one needs to consider the legality of the issues: treaties and conventions on the matter, the right of sovereignty versus collective security, the use of force versus a peaceful settlement, anticipatory self defense versus aggression, and the balance of power in regards to a nuclear or virtually nuclear Iran. A ruling on the matter can be made if examined close enough.

Iran has been pursuing nuclear ambitions for years. Starting in the 1950's with help from the United States, the program has progressed from one research reactor installed in 1967 to fifteen possible nuclear research sites including two nuclear reactors, one at Bushehr and the other being constructed at Darkovin. In 1968 Iran signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Up until 1979 the civilian nuclear program was heavily supported by the west and guided by the International Atomic Energy Agency. However, after the 1979 Islamic Revolution the nuclear program changed gears. From 1985 to 2003 parts of the Iranian nuclear research program were hidden from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and up until 2003 evidence points at an Iranian nuclear weapons program. The United States National Intelligence Estimate stated with, "a high level of confidence," that the Iranian weapons program halted in 2003 and remains inactive.

Recently, Iran has even been cooperating with the international inspectors. However, the United States and Israel still argue that Iran is secretly pursuing nuclear weapon related technologies behind the back of the International Community. The EU-3, consisting of Britain, France, and Germany, also believe that Iran has intentions beyond that of civilian nuclear power. Several exchanges have taken place between the Iranian government and the International Community. Beginning in 2006 with Resolution 1696, the Security Council of the United Nations demanded "Iran suspend uranium enrichment...or face possible economic, diplomatic sanctions." Iran has henceforth refused to stop uranium enrichment. A series of resolutions have since been passed. Resolution 1737 (2006) barred the sale of all nuclear related technology to Iran and seized assets, Resolution 1747 (2007) added an arms embargo, Resolution 1803 (2008) mandated states inspect cargo bound for Iran, and Resolution 1835 (2008) reaffirmed the previous four resolutions. Iran has refused all offers that impede its, "inalienable right," to nuclear technology including offers to enrich its uranium in Russia and face to face talks with the United States if it halts enrichment. Today experts vary in opinion but most think Iran could enrich uranium or plutonium to weapons grade within two years. They are approaching virtual nuclear power status, meaning they have the technology and fissile materials to build a nuclear weapon. The IAEA determined Iran already has enough uranium to make six nuclear bombs if enriched high enough.

The first question to consider in these issues is whether or not Iran has the right to develop nuclear capabilities. The most pertinent document in regards to this is the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (1970). Key elements to examine include Article II, Article III, Article IV, and Article X. Article II of the treaty prohibits non-nuclear states from "seeking control over such weapons," and instructs them, "not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons." This provision in and of itself is enough to theoretically outlaw nuclear weapon proliferation. Article III, P. 1 demands non-nuclear states comply with the International Atomic Energy Agency and their safeguard system preventing peaceful nuclear activities from being diverted to nuclear weapons. Article IV, P. 1 affirms the "inalienable right" of all states to develop peaceful nuclear energy sources without discrimination. Lastly, Article X, P. 1 asserts that any state can withdrawal from the treaty, "if it decides that extraordinary events...have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country." The only precondition is that it must give notice of the withdrawal three months in advance. According to Article IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty civilian nuclear development is perfectly legal and is in fact inalienable. If Iran really desired nuclear weapons it could indeed withdrawal from the treaty, and thus it argues that this is evidence that it is not pursuing nuclear weapons.