Spreading democracy throughout the world has been the cornerstone of American foreign policy in the 21st century. No where is this more apparent than in the Middle East, where it is hoped the spread of democracy would bring about freedom for all. The reality however, is quite different. When given the opportunity to participate in elections, extremist parties – who are often vehemently anti-democratic and anti-American – routinely come to power. In the likes of Algeria, Iran, Egypt, Turkey and the Palestinian territories extremists exploit what little democracy there is in the Middle East, much to the dismay of those pushing for democratic change in the region. So, why has policy of promoting democracy failed?
The ‘democracy-as-remedy’ formula is based on the assumption that freedom is the ultimate goal of every individual. Yet most Westerners do not know what it is like to go hungry. When it comes to food or freedom, the former trumps the latter. That’s human nature. During the Depression of the 1930’s and the subsequent rise of fascist Europe, elections were of little concern to people who struggled to put food on the table. The democratic Weimar republic failed in large part because it could not feed its people. All over Europe, people pandered to extremists who offered solutions, however excessive or radical.
Indeed, more often than not poverty causes extremism, rather than the other way around. A fairer reflection of our goals as individuals therefore, would be to put prosperity at the top of the list of goals, with freedom (and democracy) as one of several means to achieve this, along with factors like economic growth.
There is also a fallacy that democratic reform leads to economic prosperity. Historically, this is not the case. According to Harvard economist Ed Glaeser, “the view that democracy is a critical ingredient for economic growth is untenable. There is no robust statistical relationship to back it up.” In fact, Glaeser continues, “Many of the best [economic] growth experiences have been in less-than-democratic regimes … such as Lee Kwan Yew's Singapore or post-Mao China.” He does concede however, that growth rates vary far more under dictatorships than under democracies, and that crucially, “Dictators like Mobutu Sese Seko or Kim Jong Il, are about the worst thing for economic growth, other than civil war.”
MIT economist Daron Acemoglu backs Glaeser’s assessment. What’s more, he argues that historically, “many democracies suffer economically from populist and irresponsible macroeconomic policies … often adopted after transitions from repressive dictatorships and during periods when politics are turbulent.”
The failure to spread democracy in the Middle East also derives from the political history of the region. In its 5,000 year history, the Middle East has been almost totally devoid of elections. Unlike Westerners, Middle Easterners simply do not have the experience of dealing with the democratic process. It is extremely naive to believe that the modern Middle Eastern political framework – which includes monarchies, repressive secular dictators, and authoritarian rulers – can transform to a democratic system in a few short years. The US took almost 200 years before all segments of its society had equal representation. Britain was a prosperous world power long before it became democratic. France, Spain, and the Netherlands too, were wealthy imperial forces before they embraced democracy.
Nurturing the democratic system is a long, tedious process. Democracy needs time to take root and develop. Institutions need to be put in place before any elections. Difficult economic decisions that are the hallmark of initial economic growth need to be made; decisions that weak populist governments would not be able to endure. This is not to say that democracy will never work in the Arab world. Many states that started out autocratic became democratic once their people desired it. South Korea and Singapore are recent examples. China could be next.
We need to be careful not to measure the democratic development of a country by the number of elections it holds. Since the fall of the Taliban, Afghanistan had an Interim Authority (Dec 2001–June 2002), a Transitional Authority (June 2002–Dec 2004) and a Presidential authority (Dec 2004–present). Each one of these was preceded by some form of election or vote. In addition, there has been a vote on the new Afghan Constitution (Dec 2003) and a parliamentary election (Sep 2005). That is five elections or votes in as many years. After the last of these, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said, “The results of these elections will lead to the seating of Afghanistan’s National Assembly, the final step in the process begun four years ago [my italics] … to create the democratic intuitions of a sovereign Afghanistan.” Afghanistan has a GDP per capita among the lowest in the world, about 72% of the population is illiterate, and the Taliban have not even been defeated, yet the current US Administration would have you believe that an election is all you need for a democracy.
Policy makers need to look at the facts on the ground and make sober decisions based on reality and not ideals. Perhaps the time has come to reevaluate the notion that democracy, the sacred cow of the West, is the cure-all remedy for the Middle East. Safety, security, and prosperity, the true goals of the West in the Middle East, may better be served, in the short term, by a different model. Some of the small, oil-rich Gulf States, despite the lack of democracy, enjoy a relatively high standard of living. They could serve as potential models for other Arab states to mimic. The ‘Asian Tigers’ who all prospered economically before becoming democratic, could also serve as a model.
The time is ripe to consider a new Middle Eastern strategy. The road to true democracy is not through multiple elections. Elections should be one of the last steps in the democratization of the Middle East, a process that could take decades if done properly. Instead, the West should look to establish a genuine economic base and an institutional infrastructure in the Middle East from which, down the line, true democracy can emerge.
While democracy may not be the most efficient way of achieving stability, peace and prosperity, isn't the whole point that it is precisely because it is the most PROBABLE way of getting there (ultimately), that it is the best route? You yourself admit that the less-than-democratic alternative is much riskier ("growth rates vary far more under dictatorships"), with the chances of failed states being higher.
Add to that the issue of oil, which has always ensured that the "wrong kind" of people attain power, and you have the recipe for failure that has been witnessed in the Middle East time and again. Surely in a democratic system, where autocrats like Sese Seko and Kim Jong Il would be turfed out of power before they could do too much damage, is preferable to one that has the risk of entrenching them in power...