China signed the Kyoto Protocol in 1998, and is one of the largest contributors of pollution into the world’s atmosphere. Around 70% of China’s energy comes from the burning of fossil fuels and hundreds of coal-burning plants are built each year in order to meet the almost insatiable energy demands of its burgeoning population. China’s plans to harness the sun’s energy are definitely a step in the right direction towards reducing global warming.

Meanwhile, John Howard continues to sidestep environmental issues, as he courts and supports the President of the United States in his determined refusal to sign the Kyoto Protocol. Although not perfect, the Kyoto Protocol is the world’s best bet at the moment in order to start to seriously combat climate change, and John Howard would be wise to reconsider his current stubborn stance.

I refute the assumption that once a certain democratic framework is in place a democratic content will more or less follow. The empirical reality in Afghanistan, Indonesia, the Philippines and South Korea demonstrate this clash with theory. In fact, many governments worldwide are more democratic in theory than in practice. In advocating democracy, United States’ policy seeks to avoid “populist-based change, inevitably [seeking] only limited, top-down forms of democratic change” (Chomsky 2003: 59).

In questioning and challenging prevailing ideas, it is important to remember that there remains a world of difference between the breakdown of authoritarian rule and the consolidation of democracy. What also tends not to be captured in democratisation literature is that “instead of proceeding in definite stages or unfolding according to a single logic, democratic struggles are shaped by local conditions, historical peculiarities and the uncertainties of political contestation” (Smith 1998: 10). In the media, many rather simple statements, most notably from the President of the United States himself, regarding “a smooth transition to some US-sanctioned democracy” (Mackay 2003) in post-war Iraq are questionable. These comments reveal a widespread misconceived view of democracy as some sort of ready-made commodity that can be handed over to a nation and be implemented more or less immediately (Wilkinson 2003; Young 2003).

The overwhelming focus on the importance of the role of elites in the dominant liberal democratic perspective gives rise to a piquant paradox. Democracy articulated from ‘above’ rather than from ‘below’ is paradoxical (Baker 2002: 170). In fact, the ideal scenario presented in democratisation literature does little to conceal the real situation, where political discourse mutes, distorts or excludes dissenting voices. This paradoxical democracy is currently unfolding in Iraq. Occupation forces have constructed an interim administration of “hand-picked” Iraqis, undermining the right of Iraqi people to determine their own political destiny, as one Iraqi aptly put it, “manage ourselves, by ourselves” (The Age 2003). The elite-centric focus of the occupying forces ignores the fact that “[d]emocracy has to be built locally, in the here and now, and cannot be expected as a gift from above at some point in the future” (Baker 2002: 83). Failure to include Iraqi people in shaping their own future is antithetical to the very ideals professed by the occupiers. Furthermore, “the democracy that exists where I am means more to me than the democracy that exists someplace where I am not” (Konrád 1984: 139-40).

In conclusion, it is not difficult to see how the clash between assumptions and realities can lead to sterile attempts to enforce textbook solutions.

Reference

Baker, G. 2002. Civil Society and Democratic Theory: Alternative Voices, London: Routledge.

Chomsky, N. 2003. ‘’Recovering Rights’: A Crooked Path,’ in Matthew J. Gibney (ed.), Globalizing Rights: The Oxford Amnesty Lectures 1999, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 45-80.

Konrád, G. 1984. Antipolitics, London: Quartet.

Mackay, H. 2003. ‘Iraq: the questions that linger,’ The Age, 3 May 2003, p. 11.

Robison, R. 2002. ‘What sort of democracy? Predatory and neo-liberal agendas in Indonesia,’ in Catarina Kinnvall & Kristina Jönsson (eds.), Globalization and Democratization in Asia: The Construction of Identity, London and New York: Routledge, pp. 92-113.

Smith, A. M. 1998. Laclau and Mouffe: The Radical Democratic Imaginary, London and New York: Routledge.

The Age. 2003. ‘Protestors decry British launch of ‘model’ local council,’ The Age, 3 June 2003, p. 9.

Wilkinson, M. 2003. ‘After war, a hard path to peace,’ The Age, 3 May 2003, p. 15.

Young, H. 2003. ‘Iraq situation calls for a new way of thinking in US,’ The Age, Opinion, 14 May 2003, p. 15.

In questioning the highly problematic statist hegemonic discourse on democracy and democratisation promoted by the United States, various questions arise: Is there a future for liberal democracy as a universally applicable political model? To what extent can democracy vary with regard to form? If form differs (as it already does in many Western democracies), can democratic content, such as freedoms and respect for human rights, remain? Is it primarily elites who make, shape and consolidate democracy? Should Iraqi’s wait for democracy to be handed to them from ‘above’? In exploring these questions I believe it is necessary to make problematic what is taken for granted. For instance, a prevalence to view liberal democracy as the most desirable outcome with little reflection upon the difficulties involved in its implementation; uncritical acceptance of the word ‘democracy’ as a potentially universal “all-embracing phenomenon” (George 2003: 16); the right of the Iraqi people to self-determination. Although I remain critical of the statist hegemonic discourse on democracy and democratisation promoted by the United States, I do not believe it is possible to attempt to seek “the solution of a problem in the solution of another problem raised at another moment by other people” (Foucault 1983: 343 cited in Bernstein 1995: 226). At the same time, however, it is not my intention to claim that liberal democratic institutions have no value for non-Western societies. I do not purport to know what future constellation – social, economic, political – Iraqi’s desire to create; instead, I believe it is vital to question and critique the use of liberal democracy, both as an analytic tool and in practice. I believe that non-Western societies have to determine the value themselves in the light of their cultural resources, needs and circumstances, while remaining aware that these cannot be mechanically transplanted (Parekh 1993: 171-172). Surely, “[a]s long as the forms of government are acceptable to their people and meet the basic conditions of good government, …they must be at liberty to work out their political destiny themselves” (Parekh 1993: 170).

Reference

Baker, G. 2002. Civil Society and Democratic Theory: Alternative Voices, London: Routledge.

Bernstein, R. 1995. ‘Foucault: Critique as a Philosophic Ethos,’ in Michael Kelly (ed.), Critique and Power, Cambridge, Massachussetts and London: The MIT Press, pp. 211-242.

George, S. 2003. ‘Globalizing rights?,’ in Matthew J. Gibney (ed.), Globalizing Rights: The Oxford Amnesty Lectures 1999, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 15-33.

Parekh, B. 1993. ‘The cultural particularity of liberal democracy,’ in David Held (ed.), Prospects for Democracy: North, South, East, West, Cambridge: Polity Press, pp. 156-175.

Parenti, M. 1980. Democracy for the Few, New York: St Martin’s Press.

Since Indonesia achieved Independence in 1945, military self-financing has become a firmly entrenched practice in Indonesia. The Indonesian military has relied on money-making ventures outside the government budget through a wide network of legal and illegal businesses, informal security alliances with entrepreneurs, and through corruption such as ‘mark ups in military purchases.’ A flawed response to budget constraints and corruption has resulted in the spread of these businesses beyond the control of the military’s central command.

There are many obstacles to reform. A distinct lack of transparency and accountability regarding military finance issues, and unreliable and incomplete data concerning military budgets and expenditure, continue to thwart efforts, however flawed, to reform the military.

Consequently, the Indonesian military has maintained its notorious reputation as being able to act with impunity as it commits acts of abuse and corruption throughout the Indonesian archipelago.

Despite his dogmatic convictions, Bush seems to have neglected to heed the entire theory espoused by Huntington, who also warned against assumptions concerning the victory of Western democratic liberalism and the universality of Western culture. Bush continues to adhere to the belief in the universality of Western culture in a manner that is decidedly false, immoral and downright dangerous.

Nevertheless, it would appear that neither Huntington nor Bush realise that the solution to many current issues dominating the world stage, particularly those in the Middle East, does not just lie in consolidation of Western power but in learning how to live together in local communities.

The Jakarta government justifies these evictions, claiming that it is trying to maintain ‘public order, remove trespassers from private or state land, or clear land for infrastructure projects.’ At the same time, however, the government has failed to provide alternative housing options and assistance for these victims, effectively consigning them to a life of abject poverty on the streets of Jakarta.

Perversely, however, the government’s efforts have done little to maintain ‘public order’ and have effectively transferred the problem to another part of the city and succeeded in stirring up public unrest.

Yet again, Indonesia continues to flout national and international law, and fails to live up to its international commitments as it continues to aggressively pursue international investors with little or no regard for human rights (hrw.org).

Despite these criticisms, public sentiment also indicates an emerging desire for the two nations to put their differences aside and start to work together in order to address many of the prominent issues currently afflicting the world.

It is also interesting to note that Bush’s visit served to highlight issues pertaining to foreign policy and foreign wars that the average person tends to ignore, largely because they fall outside their everyday lives. The extensive media coverage regarding the American President’s visit added a dimension of reality to some of these issues, particularly when people watched live TV coverage of the visit, and prompted many to express their personal views regarding world issues for the first time.

Several discrepancies emerge throughout this article. Although a convincing argument is ultimately presented, it is evident that Boudreau utilises information in a markedly biased and frequently incorrect manner. He presents a strong argument, however it is flawed and somewhat discredited due to data inaccuracies and omissions. I mention this because it is important to seek to identify and distinguish fact from fiction in order to analyse information effectively and formulate rational conclusions. In short, the Philippine case is favoured over the Indonesian case, with the democracy movement in the Philippines portrayed as a success, while that in Indonesia is largely portrayed as a failure. A major problem emerges regarding Boudreau’s description of the use of power by Marcos and Suharto throughout the article. Boudreau states that Marcos held periodic elections and allowed brief periods of liberalisation. Suharto is portrayed as feeling compelled to do neither. In actual fact, both leaders relaxed restrictions on the press and dressed up their administrations in democratic garb. From the late 1980s to the mid-1990s, Indonesia experienced the longest period of ‘openness’, tolerance, and political debate during Suharto’s reign, albeit within the confines of New Order orthodoxy (Elson, 2001). I will now explore further the rationale behind the decision of a regime to allow periods of ‘openness’.

Some scholars state that mass political culture has certain influences over the political process, but maintain that democratic culture is not a prerequisite for democracy. They argue that democratic political culture emerges at the elite level. It is also argued that elites select democracy because they believe the costs outweigh the benefits in trying to suppress political opposition. However, application of such arguments can prove problematic. In Indonesia and the Philippines, neither of which are genuine democracies, rulers maintain and legitimate authoritarian rule under the guise of democratic practices. Thus, prospects for genuine and meaningful elite-instigated democratisation are slim. Openings for democracy come from above, although genuine democratic reform is not necessarily intended by these hollow gestures, in response to pressure from below. This is evident in Indonesia and the Philippines.

In Indonesia, Suharto only allowed a more open political atmosphere after many years of repressing and depoliticising society. By the end of the 1980s, Suharto ruled a rapidly changing society due to social and economic changes. A nascent civil society was emerging which clamoured for more direct and transparent political participation. Thus, Indonesia’s increased prosperity created a more sophisticated society increasingly difficult to repress (Elson, 2001).

In the Philippines, Marcos’ “short-term strategy to derail an opposition alliance produced over time more movement vehicles against the state. Each election, plebiscite, or liberalising measure enticed new (as well as established) oppositionists to speak and act against the regime” (Boudreau, 1999: 5). Thus, “the anti-dictatorship movement accumulated increasingly broad and established movement institutions…this accumulation both forced Marcos’s periodic liberalising gestures and produced such protest during these open moments as to compel the regime to resort to violence and cheating that…further polarised society and hastened the regime’s demise” (Boudreau, 1999: 6).

In concluding this essay, I maintain that initial openings for democracy, whether genuine or not, may be initiated by a ruling elite in response to pressure from below. However, despite the downfall of both Suharto and Marcos, no real democratic reform has occurred in Indonesia or the Philippines. The succeeding leaders have proved reluctant to upset the status quo, and the consolidation of democracy appears to have stalled in both countries. Thus, theories espousing the importance of the initiation of democratic political culture at the elite level are convincing.

REFERENCES:

Boudreau, V. 1999. ‘Diffusing democracy? People power in Indonesia and the Philippines?’, Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, 31 (4): 3-18, Cedar, Michigan

Elson, R. E. 2001. Suharto – A Political Biography, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom

Shi, T. 2000. “Political culture: A prerequisite for democracy?”, American Asian Review, 18 (2): 53-83, Queens